Mittwoch, 17. Juli 2013

Do Huu Ca, Chief of the Hai Phong City Police, on July 13 was promoted to General

Đoan Trang - No one knows exactly what achievements he has made in the recent years to be promoted. However, just listen to what Ca said about the Tien Lang land eviction. The interview was conducted by VnMedia on January 8, 2012, three days after the incident.

The language Ca spoke is typical of the communist idiosyncrasy which can be found abundant in Chinese and Vietnamese propaganda materials. Moreover, what he spoke of also demonstrates the mindset of a communist police which is too familiar with suppression of “anti-state elements” and "hostile forces".

- The eviction is under the jurisdiction of the [Tien Lang] District. They just reported to me that there would be an eviction as such, and asked for troops. I just signed the grant of troops. The District took responsibility for implementing their detailed plans. Obviously, however, as soon as Comrade Mải [Chief of theTien Lang police, one of the six policemen injured in the case – note by the interviewer] comes back from hospital will I organize experience-sharing meeting.

(Question: Regarding the eviction in Tien Lang, there have been opinions that it is not worthwhile to deploy hundreds of troops just to grab a shrimp swamp, especially as many could be injured. What’s your opinion on that, Colonel?)

- Actually what you are asking is also what some officials are thinking. I have told them that their perceptions were all wrong. The seizure of a swamp was a very normal thing to do - an administrative proceeding under the jurisdiction of that District. The proceeding was just mediocre, and the performers were rightful. Eight reconciliation efforts had failed, the court has also issued a verdict, but Vuon stubbornly clung to the swamp and refused to return the swamp to local authorities. The local authorities thus had to vacate him, and that was absolutely lawful.

In this case, the only regret was that the grabbers, including the police, military troops, and other forces did not know their target Vuon thoroughly. Vuon resisted, but the grabbers did not know that beforehand, so there were some losses. But that’s our private affair. When we deployed troops there, we meant to catch a criminal, because that criminal resisted against people performing official duties, injuring our people. Moreover, as Vuon used landmines and took other dangerous measures, I had to deploy strong forces for suppression. These are two distinct issues. (…)

When I deployed more troops to the site, those criminals had evacuated. It was fortunate that they had left, otherwise we would have had to take stronger actions to suppress their actions and the consequences would have been worse. On that day, I, and four deputy chiefs, were all present at the site to lead the fight. [sic] We had thought of the worst scenario, so we had prepared sufficient arms and ammunition. [sic] When I arrived, unaware that those criminals had evacuated, all combat plans were being implemented.

That attack failed to arrest criminal Vuon, but succeeded in suppressing him. I must admit that the combined operations were extremely fantastic. I told you, there has never been any exercise as successful as such. That the mobile force employed boats to approach the site is unheard-of in our textbooks, that they had to use bamboo crafts to secretly move in and encounter the criminals, that they staged diversion with a direct encounter, that they combated in different arrays, etc. I think these manoeuvres were all fantastic, and can be brought into book. I told our comrades (…) that this was not a planned military exercise, but there were actually many things to learn. [The eviction] was splendid with spectacular coordination between local authorities, the army, the border police, so there is nothing to complain about.